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STATISTICAL PROOF AND THEORIES OF
DISCRIMINATION
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK*
Barbara Norris's article explains the relationship among disparate
treatment theory, disparate impact theory, and multiple regression.' It is a
powerful combination. It is altogether too powerful; it proves far too much.
The basic crunch on employers comes from the combination of the
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. Disparate treatment
theory requires employers to hire randomly or on some measure of merit.
Most choose merit, at least in part. But disparate impact theory is suspicious
of all measures of merit; employers must justify each measure used with
prohibitively expensive validation studies. The combination is a great one-
two punch for plaintiffs: charge the employer with disparate treatment, and
when he explains the rejection of women or minorities with measures of
merit, charge him with disparate impact on the basis of each and every
defense. This strategy has been available since Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 2 I have
been telling my students about this for years, and Sullivan, Zimmer, and
Richards put it in their treatise.3 Lots of plaintiffs' lawyers also must have
thought of it. Barbara Norris suggests that Segar v. Smith 4 is the first opinion
to set out the whole scheme. That is surprising, if true.
Statistical evidence greatly increases the power of this analytic scheme.
With statistics, a plaintiff can raise a strong presumption of disparate
treatment without examining the qualifications of a single employee or
applicant. But there are unexamined assumptions in this approach. All
statistical techniques depend on technical assumptions that are rarely met in
the real world. Indeed, a good technique for defense lawyers is to hire
mathematical statisticians, generally found in university departments of
statistics or mathematics, who will often testify that none of the assumptions
are met and plaintiff's statistics prove nothing. Some of these experts seem to
think the assumptions are never met and statistics are entirely useless for any
purpose; such views are apparently a source of prestige among
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mathematicians. The sensible plaintiff's response is to hire applied
statisticians, generally found in university departments of social science,
"think tanks," or consulting firms, who have thought seriously about which
assumptions can be relaxed and by how much without doing serious damage
to the resulting inferences. Many statistical techniques are said to be robust
against their assumptions, which means that there is relative freedom to relax
the assumptions without doing serious damage to the resulting inferences.
Robust statistical tests can be put to good use in the real world.
Some assumptions, however, are indispensable. Most statistics in
employment discrimination cases compare two populations, such as blacks
and whites or men and women. One assumption that can never be relaxed is
that the two populations are the same in all respects except for the possible
difference under investigation and for any differences that have been
controlled. If the two populations are a little bit different, the inference will
be a little bit off, but usable. If the two populations are a lot different, the
inference will be worthless. The assumption is acknowledged in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,5 the case that sets out the theoretical
basis for statistical evidence in Title VII cases. The Court explicitly assumes
that but for discrimination, the employer's work force would in the long run
mirror the racial composition of the labor force from which it was hired.6
That conclusion requires the further implicit assumption that the black and
white populations are substantially the same in all relevant ways, so that any
differences in result are attributable to discrimination. 7
Some variation of that assumption is critical to all statistical evidence of
disparate treatment. It is a powerful and implausible assumption: the two
populations are assumed to be substantially the same in their distribution of
skills, aptitudes, and job preferences. Two hundred and fifty years of slavery,
nearly a century of Jim Crow, and a generation of less virulent discrimination
are assumed to have had no effect; the black and white populations are
assumed to be substantially the same. All the differential socialization of little
girls that feminists justifiably complain about is assumed to have had no effect;
the male and female populations are assumed to be substantially the same.
This assumption, which is so critical to statistical disparate treatment
cases, is fundamentally inconsistent with the policy premise of disparate
impact theory. The explicit premise of disparate impact theory is that women
and minorities have suffered from discrimination. Measures of skill and merit
are suspect because discrimination has left many minorities with fewer and
less developed skills. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the seminal disparate impact
case, relies explicitly on the history of segregated and inferior education for
5. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
6. Id. at 339 n.20.
7. This assumption is not inherent in disparate treatment theory, but it is inherent in statistical
proof of disparate treatment. The requirement that the compared groups be substantially the same
for statistical proof parallels the requirement that the compared individuals be similarly situated for
individual proof.
[Vol. 49: No. 4
Page 97: Autumn 1986]
blacks in North Carolina schools. 8 So disparate impact theory insists that
employers require only those skills essential to the job. To require skills
unnecessarily is to exclude minorities unnecessarily.
It should now be clear what is wrong with the one-two punch of turning all
disparate treatment defenses into disparate impact claims: the two theories
are inconsistent. The disparate treatment half of the strategy assumes that the
black and white populations, or the male and female populations, are
identical. The disparate impact half simultaneously assumes that they are
greatly different. This pair of inconsistent assumptions lets the plaintiff
"prove" discrimination, but the proof is invalid.
The introduction of multiple regression analysis further increases the
power of the technique, but it does not eliminate the underlying fallacy.
Multiple regression is a far more sophisticated tool than the simple standard
deviation analysis in International Brotherhood of Teamsters. It is one of a number
of techniques for standardizing disparate populations. Another way to say it
is that multiple regression allows you to control for known differences
between the two populations. When properly used, multiple regression can
measure the impact of all the factors suspected to contribute to differences in
employment history, and can show how much of the difference is due to each
cause.
The technique also measures the residual difference unexplained by the
factors put into the equation. It is common in Title VII litigation to attribute
the entire residual difference to discrimination, but that is incorrect. The
residual difference represents the sum of all other factors contributing to the
difference in employment history. Regression analysis assumes that these
factors are minor and substantially independent of each other.9 If the
investigator suspects that much of the residual difference is caused by an
identifiable factor, he should put that factor into the equation as an
independent variable. 0
One way to estimate the effect of discrimination is to include in the
equation a dummy variable for race or sex."l For example, whites might be
recorded as zero and blacks as one. Then, if all the assumptions are
reasonably met, the coefficient of the dummy variable will measure
discrimination's contribution to the differences in employment history. This
interpretation assumes that there are no significant interaction effects
between the dummy variable and the other independent variables;
fortunately, it is possible to test whether that assumption is met. After the
independent effect of race or sex has been measured by the dummy variable,
there will probably still be an unexplained residual difference.
Another way to estimate the effect of discrimination is to compute separate
regression equations for blacks and whites or for men and women. Then,
8. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
9. H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 367, 445-46 (2d ed. 1972).
10. Id. at 367-68, 450.
11. For an explanation of dummy variables, see id. at 498-502. For an illustration of their use in
the employment discrimination context, see Norris, supra note 1, at 67-68.
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differences in the coefficients of explanatory variables indicate differences in
the experience of the races or the sexes. 12 This technique is seldom used,
perhaps because the resulting equations are harder to interpret. But it has
two significant advantages: it requires fewer assumptions, and it preserves
much more information. If the experience of blacks and whites has been
greatly different, including blacks and whites in the same regression equation
produces a composite equation that does not accurately reflect the experience
of either race. The classic illustration is the man submerged in boiling water
below the waist and encased in ice above the waist. One might say that he is
comfortable on average, but that would be wrong. Including widely disparate
groups in a single regression equation involves the same fallacy.
Like all other statistical techniques, multiple regression depends on
certain assumptions. The great advantage of multiple regression is that it is
not necessary to assume that the black and white populations are identical. It
is enough to assume that they are identical in all relevant ways not controlled
for in the regression equation. But this assumption is crucial. 13
In theory, the investigator can control for any number of known
differences by adding more variables to the equation. In practice, there are
sharp limits on variables for which he can control. First, adding more
variables divides the two populations into smaller and smaller subgroups or
cells. The subgroups quickly become too small to support statistical
inferences; differences in small subgroups often result from random variation.
Therefore, the more variables in the equation, the larger the population must
be. 14 If the population is all the employees of a particular employer, it may be
too small to regress on many variables simultaneously.
Second, all variables must be expressed numerically. That obstacle is not
insuperable; subjective evaluations of training or job performance can be
expressed in numerical scales. But then the third obstacle appears. Title VII
law is suspicious of subjective judgments.' 5 Prejudiced employers might use
subjective judgments to cover up discrimination, and it is burdensome to
review the employer's subjective judgments. So Title VII regression
equations are largely limited to variables that do not depend on anyone's
12. For an example of this technique, see Sullivan, The Occupational Prestige of Women Immigrants:
A Comparison of Cubans and Mexicans, 18 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 1045 (1984). This article uses four
separate equations to explain differences in occupational prestige in the United States of Cuban men,
Cuban women, Mexican men, and Mexican women. The same independent variables are used in
each equation, but there are sharp differences in the effects of each variable in each of the four
equations. A single regression equation for "Hispanic immigrants" would have concealed these
differences and produced a misleading average. A single equation with dummy variables for sex and
ethnicity would have shown that there were differences among the four sexual and ethnic groups, but
such an equation would have concealed the nature of those differences.
13. H. BLALOCK, supra note 9, at 367.
14. Statisticians use various rules of thumb for the minimum number of cases necessary to
support analysis of an additional variable. For example, one text recommends that there be at least
fifty persons in each major cell of the analysis. A. POLLARD, F. YUSUF & G. POLLARD, DEMOGRAPHIC
TECHNIQUES 130 (2d ed. 1981).
15. See, e.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 345 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Norris, supra note 1, at 65-66.
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subjective judgment. Examples are years of education and years of
experience.
The assumption that the two populations are substantially the same in
those respects that depend on subjective judgment is again contrary to reality
and contrary to the premises of civil rights policy. A regression equation that
equates a year in the typical inner city school with a year in a typical suburban
school, or a year at North Carolina Central University with a year at Duke
University, ignores all the premises of the school desegregation cases. If our
society has discriminated against minorities in education, there should be a
remedy. As a society, we still owe the victims of that discrimination an
effective education. But it does not follow that an employer is guilty of
disparate treatment in employment when he hires or promotes a better
educated applicant.
The fourth obstacle to including explanatory variables in the regression
equation is disparate impact theory. Whether subjective or objective, all
factors used to explain differences in employment success must be validated.
That is, it must be shown that the factors really predict betterjob performance
or justify better pay. 16 Formal validation is difficult and expensive. Again, the
one-two punch of combined disparate treatment and disparate impact theory
is based on inconsistent premises. Disparate impact theory takes explanatory
variables out of the equation because minorities have been deprived of the
chance to acquire skills. But when the court removes these variables and then
interprets the coefficient of the dummy variable for race or sex as
discrimination (or, more egregiously, when it interprets the residual
difference as discrimination), it is assuming that blacks and whites have
identical distributions of those very same skills.
In theory, all of this is merely a device for shifting the burden of proof. An
employer can rebut a disparate impact case by validating his selection criteria,
and he can rebut a statistical disparate treatment case by showing that the two
populations are not identical. However, these opportunities for rebuttal are
more theoretical than real. With respect to disparate impact, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and some of the lower courts
seem determined to make validation impossible.' 7 The Supreme Court cases
16. See generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-39 (1975).
17. The relevant division of the American Psychological Association criticized the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) 1970 testing guidelines as "professionally
unrealistic and effectively unattainable." Brief for the Division of Industrial-Organizational
Psychology of the American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae, at 20, Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), reprinted in 88 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281, 309 (1977). The 1978 Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures were delayed by the EEOC's insistence on testing requirements that the other
enforcement agencies found unworkable. That disagreement is reviewed from the perspective of the
Civil Service Commission in Seelman, Employment Testing Law: The Federal Agencies Go Public with the
Problems, 10 URB. LAw. 1 (1978). Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair of the EEOC during the Carter
Administration, stated her fear that employers would find ways to validate tests and the valid tests
would still have disparate impact. Transcript of EEOC Commissioners Meeting, December 22, 1977,
quoted in Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise
of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 377 n.334 (1983).
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are mixed. 18 With respect to disparate treatment, rebuttals are largely limited
to objective criteria reflected in the employer's records. No one can read all
or even most of the cases in this area, but I know of only one case in which the
employer has successfully relied on general social and economic data to show
that the two populations compared are widely different.' 9
The astonishing thing about the difficulty of rebuttal is that neither side
believes the two populations are identical. Plaintiffs even more than
defendants believe that women and minorities have suffered from
discrimination. A set of rules that imposes a nearly insuperable burden of
proving a fact that both sides believe to be true cannot be explained or
justified on the ground that it merely shifts the burden of proof.
All of this also helps explain the recurring complaints that it is difficult for
plaintiffs to win one-on-one discrimination cases. The conventional wisdom is
that motive is hard to prove, and that courts are reluctant to impute bad
motives on the part of employers. There is something to both of those points,
and courts should infer bad motive from suspicious circumstances more often
than they do. 20 The standard is preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a
reasonable doubt.
But something else is going on in the one-on-one cases. The false
assumption that skills and preferences are identically distributed among all
racial and sexual groups is largely irrelevant to the one-on-one cases. Judges
can and do examine the qualifications of an actual plaintiff. Sometimes it will
appear that the plaintiff was the victim of discrimination. Sometimes it will
appear that he was less qualified than the competing applicant. That
unfortunate possibility is assumed away in the statistical cases.
Segar v. Smith 2l is a good example of a case in which the court failed to
understand all the reasons why statistical and individual proof might point in
opposite directions. The district court found statistical proof of
discrimination even though it did not find for plaintiffs on a single alleged
discriminatory incident. 22 The court of appeals was untroubled; it saw no
reason to require "anecdotal" evidence to supplement the statistics:
18. Compare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248-52 (1976) (Court let employer use one
paper and pencil test to validate another paper and pencil test) with Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975) (Court adopted stringent EEOC guidelines on test validation); compare
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977) (Court refused to assume relationship between
size and strength) with New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (Court
disposed of business necessity issue in one sentence plus a footnote, finding it sufficient that
excluding methadone patients from all positions reduced the burden of monitoring employees).
19. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 79-C-4373 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 1986) discussed in N.Y.
Times, Feb. 4, 1986, at 8, col. 1.
20. Perhaps the classic example of refusal to infer motive occurred in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). The employer adopted stringent new testing requirements on the day Title VII
took effect, but the Court refused to infer a racial motive. Another egregious example is Garcia v.
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981), in which plaintiff was
discharged for speaking one sentence in Spanish. The court found no evidence that the discharge or
the rule against Spanish was motivated by ethnic hostility. Id. at 270.
21. 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985).
22. Id. at 1277.
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Such a rule would reflect little more than a superstitious hostility to statistical proof, a
preference for the intuitionistic and individualistic over the scientific and systemic. It
is not difficult to understand that discrimination might exist even when affected
individuals can point to no specific instances of an employer's discriminatory conduct.
The days of Bull Connor are largely past; discrimination now works more subtly.23
The problem is more difficult than that. An employer can easily
discriminate without making statements that reveal his motive. It is possible,
but much more difficult, to discriminate without leaving a record of deserving
women or minorities who were passed over in favor of white males. If some of
the white males were less deserving, or if a disproportionate number of the
ties go to white males, there is "anecdotal" evidence of discrimination. If no
such incidents can be found and the employer has not destroyed his records,
the court has to consider the possibility that there is something wrong with
the statistics. It is quite likely that the statistics are invalid because the
populations are not comparable, and that the imbalance in defendant's
workforce is more the result of differences in the two populations than the
result of discrimination. That may not invariabiy be true; some discriminators
are exceptionally clever. But differences between the two populations are far
more likely than discrimination that leaves no trace. The court's contrary
assumption leaves it vulnerable to its own epithets: its blind faith in statistical
evidence without consideration of the assumptions underlying the statistical
techniques reflects a superstitious faith in the pseudoscientific. It is not
scientific to do statistical comparisons of widely different populations without
controlling for the differences.
Of course, plaintiffs do not win all statistical cases, either. The
combination of disparate impact and statistical proof of disparate treatment is
a juggernaut, but plaintiffs can mess up the statistics badly enough to lose the
advantage. 24 More important, defendants and some judges have tried to
throw sand in the gears. Stuck with premises that led to results they could not
live with, some judges have refused to go along, reallocating the burden of
proof,2 5 restricting the scope of disparate impact theory, 26 or throwing up
hyper-technical objections that plaintiffs properly view as illegitimate. 27
23. Id. at 1278.
24. E.g., EEOC v. International Business Machs. Corp., 583 F. Supp. 875, 898-99 (D. Md. 1984)
(plaintiff introduced a multiple regression equation that neglected to control for seniority, job level,
or education).
25. See Coates v. Johnson &Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 542-45 (7th Cir. 1985) (plaintiffs bear the
burden of proving that defendants' explanatory variables are tainted by discrimination).
26. Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 673 F.2d 798, 816-17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038
(1982); Pouncey v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982); Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls,
665 F.2d 531, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1982).
27. Perhaps the best known example is New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568
(1979), in which the Court found no evidence that discharging or refusing to hire drug abusers on
methadone maintenance had disparate impact on blacks or Hispanics. The evidence showed that
63% of the patients in New York City's public methadone maintenance programs were black or
Hispanic. The Court found this statistic irrelevant to the plaintiff class, which consisted of
methadone patients who had been successfully maintained on methadone for one year. The Court
speculated that private methadone patients might be disproportionately Anglo, and that Anglo
methadone patients might succeed more frequently than minority methadone patients. Neither
objection had been raised in the trial court, so there was no evidence either way. But the disparate
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The solution is to address the underlying fallacy. For some highly skilled
jobs, I do not think plaintiffs make even a prima facie case by relying on
statistics about objective minimum credentials. By highly skilled jobs, I do
not mean only professional jobs or the traditional skilled crafts. In an
economy with increasingly complex machinery and instruction manuals, both
of which are frequently changed or replaced, strong reading skills are
important in a wide range of jobs traditionally considered semiskilled.
Unfortunately, there is no reason to assume that reading skills are now
distributed without regard to race. Some individuals are wholly
unemployable at any job.28 Those misfortunes affect all races and both sexes,
but probably not in proportionate numbers.
Whatever the standard for shifting the burden of proof to the employer,
the essential reform is that rebuttal must be feasible. In disparate impact
cases, proof of validity must be possible in the real world at reasonable
expense. There are ways to make this possible. Some defenders of the
existing legal rules have argued that validation is much easier than a reading
of the case law would suggest, in part because content validation is
inexpensive and applicable to a broad range of tests. 29 Other researchers
have argued that data from criterion validation studies can be cumulated and
generalized. 30 This approach avoids the expense required for every employer
to replicate the studies. More important, it greatly increases the statistical
power to distinguish valid from invalid tests. 3 ' Single-employer studies
typically involve small samples of employees with similar scores: good
enough to get hired but not so good that they found a better job. Because
studies on such small and homogenous groups tend to be inconclusive,
employers lose simply because they bear the burden of proof.
In disparate treatment cases, proof of differences between the two
populations must be admissible. Once admitted, such evidence must not be
subjected to a level of scrutiny that makes it futile. Subjective evaluations
must be given reasonable weight and, if necessary, reviewed on an individual
basis. For large employers, the court might review a random sample of
subjective evaluations to see if they were being used to hide discrimination.
impact would not have been eliminated even if the private patients had been exclusively Anglo. The
disparate impact could have been eliminated if Anglo methadone patients succeeded two or three
times as often as minority methadone patients, but there was no basis to assume such a large
difference in success rates. It is possible that Anglo heroin addicts retain some social advantage that
helps them succeed on methadone maintenance, but it is equally plausible to assume that heroin
addicts do not differ much by race. It is surely implausible to assume that Anglo methadone patients
succeed two or three times as often. I would have accepted plaintiffs' proof and required the
employer to rebut it before reaching the implausible conclusion that discrimination against a class of
methadone patients in New York City has no disparate impact on blacks and Hispanics.
28. For example, in New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), the Supreme
Court concluded that one-third of methadone patients were "unquestionably . . . unemployable."
Id. at 577. This characterization was based on the trial court's findings of fact. Id. at 577 n.14.
29. Doverspike, Barret & Alexander, The Feasibility of Traditional Validation Procedures for
Demonstrating Job-Relatedness, 9 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 35 (1985).
30. Schmidt & Hunter, Employment Testing: Old Theories and New Research Findings, 36 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1128 (1981).
31. Id. at 1128, 1132.
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Reviewing subjective evaluations is burdensome, but the alternatives are to
exclude them or defer to them blindly. Excluding them will never work,
because there are subjective differences among employees. Deferring to them
blindly will never work, because employers do use them to discriminate. Both
of those alternatives lead to results wholly out of touch with reality.
The same lessons are applicable to quota remedies, if they survive
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 32 and to affirmative action plans. If a
court or employer sets a goal without considering subjective differences in
skill distributions, the goal will be wholly unrealistic. Such a goal will be
impossible to meet except by hiring minorities who are much less qualified
than many of the rejected nonminorities.
I do not suggest that public policy can ignore the effects of past
discrimination. I think we are morally bound to address those effects. We
need more research to determine how to equalize educational opportunity,
more investment in education to implement what we learn, and more
remedial education for victims of past discrimination. We need more effective
public health and nutrition programs, and more effective social services for
troubled families and especially for preschoolers. We need to find ways of
encouraging family stability and a vastly lower rate of illegitimacy and teenage
parenthood. These are not "blame-the-victim" solutions, as Marilyn
Yarbrough's article suggests.3 3 They are solutions directed to the problem. If
the problem is that many of our citizens are deprived of a chance to acquire
skills, the solution is to develop their skills, not to hire and promote them as
though they already had such skills.
A remedy that improved the skills of disadvantaged citizens would be a
societal investment in human capital that would surely pay for itself. But the
political system resists the expense of the investment, and current
employment discrimination law tries to solve the problem without any visible
expense. The result is to put the whole burden on employers and marginal
white workers. Current discrimination law pressures employers to hire and
promote less skilled minorities, but it does little to give minorities the skills of
which they have been deprived. The pressures to hire and to promote create
demand for minority employees in the most highly skilled jobs that far
exceeds the supply of minority workers ready to fill those jobs. Employers
susceptible to such pressure are rapidly promoting far too many talented
minorities well beyond their Peter Principle level. 34
Over-promotion is not a solution, but a disaster. It imposes terrible costs
on the minorities who receive these promotions and on the competing
32. 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
33. Yarbrough, Disparate Impact, Disparate Treatment, and the Displaced Homemaker, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1986, at 109.
34. The Peter Principle posits that employees who do a good job are promoted. They keep
getting promotions until they no longer do a goodjob. Then, because no one is ever demoted, they
stay until retirement in the job they do not do well. L. PETER & R. HULL, THE PETER PRINCIPLE 24-25
(1969). The Principle is an exaggerated statement of a real risk. For minorities, the risk is
aggravated by the pressure to promote them in proportion to their numbers without first correcting
the consequences of past discrimination and disadvantage.
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applicants and employees who do not receive them. For the first time in the
history of race relations, we are giving the majority a legitimate grievance
against minorities. And we are legitimating open racial and ethnic
competition over shares of the quota pie.35 The consequences of these
developments should be horrifying to all who care about nondiscrimination.
POSTSCRIPr
While this article was in page proof, the Supreme Court decided several
relevant cases. First, the Court upheld some remedial uses of racial quotas in
voluntary affirmative action plans,3 6 in consent decrees, 37 and in litigated
decrees if the discrimination has been especially egregious or intransigent.38
Quotas thus survived the contrary dictum in Firefighters v. Stotts. 3 9 But there is
a new emphasis on tailoring the quota to the impact of the employer's past
discrimination on his work force.40 Quotas are not supposed to undo the
effects of societal discrimination. 4 1 It will be all the more important to base
goals and quotas on an accurate assessment of the distribution of skills in the
population.
Second, in Bazemore v. Friday, the Court had its first encounter with
multiple regression: the Court unanimously held that regression equations
may help prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence even
though some possibly relevant variables are omitted. 42 As the unanimous
decision suggests, the Court's holding was uncontroversial on the facts of the
case. One of the regression equations in the record used the employer's
subjective evaluation of performance as a variable. 43 There was evidence that
the other missing variables were unimportant or that they would not tend to
reduce or explain the racial differences in pay.44 And the statistical evidence
was supported by extensive anecdotal evidence. 45  The proof of
discrimination in Bazemore did not depend on the fallacies discussed in this
article, and the Court had no occasion to address them.
35. For a detailed example, see Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, The Supreme Court, and the
Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 804-08 (1979).
36. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1850-52 (1986) (plurality opinion), rehg
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3320 (1986); id. at 1853-54 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
37. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
38. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
39. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579-83 (1984), discussed in text
supra note 32.
40. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3050-52 (1986);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1848-50 (1986) (plurality opinion); reh 'g denied, 106
S. Ct. 3320 (1986); id. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1847-48 (1986) (plurality opinion); reh'g
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3320 (1986); id. at 1854 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. Bazemore v. Friday, 106 S. Ct. 3000, 3007-11 (1986).
43. Id. at 3009, 3011 n.15.
44. Id. at 3010-11.
45. Id. at 3009-10.
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